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1. Introduction
Recent empirical studies by Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981) report a
significant negative relation between abnormal returns and market value of
common equity for samples of NYSE and NYSE-AMEX firms respectively. Brown,
Kleidon and Marsh (1982a) find that the apparent relation is actually
reversed over certain intervals of time, while Keim (1982a) shows that the
small firm premium is always positive in January from 1963 to 1979. Keim
reports that nearly fifty percent of the average annual size effect can be
attributed to the month of January, and more than half of the January effect
occurs during the first week of trading. A complete explanation of the
apparent size effect requires, therefore, separate explanations for both the
sizable small-firm premium every January and the smaller and non-stationary
premiums in the other months.
Subsequent studies of the January effect have examined a tax-loss
selling hypothesis [discussed in Wachtel (1942), Branch (1977) and Keim
(1982a)] that the small-firm premium in the first few days of the year is a
reaction to tax selling pressure at the end of the tax year for the shares
of these firms. These studies have taken two different empirical
approaches. First, Reinganum (1982) and Roll (1982) examine U.S. stock
return data and report a negative relation between January returns and the
extent to which the firm's price declined over the previous six-month
period, which they interpret as support for the tax-loss hypothesis.
However, neither study attempts to control for other variables that may
affect January returns or investigates whether the phenomenon is unique to
January.
A second method of obtaining evidence on the tcix-loss hypothesis is to
examine stock return patterns on stock markets in countries with different
-2-
tax year^nds, on the assumption
that international arbitrage is
inhibited.
Gultekin and Gultekin (1982) and
Korajc.yk (1982) both exandne the
monthly
returns of value-weighted stoc)c
market indices in countries with
widely
differing tax laws and tax year-ends.
Both studies find evidence of a
persistent but generally less
significant (than the U.S.) January
effect in
„ost of the countries, with
Gultekin and Gultekin interpreting
the evidence
as support for the tax-loss
hypothesis and Korajczyk interpreting
it as not
supportive. One drawback to these
studies is that a single market index
does not allow discrimination
between small and large firms.
Further,
analysis of a value-weighted index,
which is more heavily influenced
by
large firms, does not. permit
detection of the more important
seasonal
patterns in s^^ fi- stock returns that are allegedly
the result of
country-specific tax laws. jo sfi:j
in this study, we extend the
discussion of the tax loss selUng
hypothesis and also examine the
month-to-month small firm return premium
for
a sample of AustraUan stocks
for the period 1958 to 1981.
Although the
basic idea behind the tax-loss
selUng hypothesis seems straightforward,
a
number of factors ndtigate any
impact that tax related selUng may
have on
stock prices. We argue that, at
best, the tax loss hypothesis
leads to
ambiguous predictions.
in Australia, the tax year-end
is June 30, and the tax treatment
of
capital gains/losses is such
that the tax-loss selUng hypothesis
predicts a
auly seasonal .n returns for
small stocks. We fxnd that the
raw returns for
.ost Australian stocks exhibit
pronounced December-January and
July-August
seasonals, with the largest (and
roughly equal) effects in January
and July.
The persistence of these seasonals
across almost all size categories
results
in an Australian "size effect—the
smallest 10. of the firms earn an
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average monthly premium relative to the other 9 deciles of at least 4%—with
a month by month behavior that is very different from that observed in the
U.S. Unlike the U.S. effect, the Australian size premium for small firms,
whether measured with raw returns or with abnormal returns relative to the
Sharpe-Lintner CAPM, appears fairly constant across all months.
It might be possible to construe some of our empirical results as more
indicative of the degree of integration of world capital markets than as
inconsistent with the tax-loss selling hypothesis. However, although this
may "explain" the Australian January seasonal, it leaves unexplained the
August and December seasonals. The theoretical ambiguity of tax effects and
the Australian evidence presented here tend to support the conclusion that
the relation between the teuc year and the U.S. January seasonal may be more
correlation than causation.
Sections 2 and 3 discuss the tax-loss hypothesis with respect to the
U.S. and Australia, and Sections 4 and 5 report the data and results.
Section 6 briefly discusses our results in an integrated capital markets
context, and contains concluding remarks.
2. Tax Loss Selling
The tax loss selling hypothesis has been advanced most often to explain
the January effect. The hypothesis maintains that tax laws influence
investors ' portfolio decisions by encouraging the sale of securities that
have experienced recent price declines so that the (short-term) capital loss
can be offset against taxable income. Small firm stocks are likely
candidates for tax loss selling since these stocks typically have higher
variances of price changes and, therefore, larger probabilities of large
price declines. Importantly, the tax loss argument relies on the assumption
that investors wait until the tax year-end to sell their common stock
"losers." For example, in the U.S., a combination of liquidity requirements
and eagerness to realize capital losses before the new tax year may dictate
sale of such securities at year-end. The heavy selling pressure during this
period supposedly depresses the prices of small firm stocks. After the tax
year-end, the price pressure disappears and prices rebound to equilibrium
levels. Hence, small firm stocks display large returns in the beginning of
2
the new tax year.
There are, as Roll (1982) and others recognize, obvious problems with
the above argument. The major problem is that even if it were established
that there is heavy tax related selling of a particular security at year-
end, this does not necessarily imply any price decline. Realizations of
capital gains and losses need not be associated with a shift in the demand
functions for stocks. Although the price pressure hypothesis suggests that
a firm's common stock - being unique - has a downward sloping demand curve,
it is generally recognized that securities with similar risk characteristics
will serve as close substitutes for inclusion in an investor's portfolio
(see Scholes (1972)). In this case, the demand curve is essentially
horizontal and tax related selling should have no effect on security prices.
Further, the mechanics of this price pressure argument are unclear. If
sales are made purely for tax purposes (as opposed to a desire to liquidate
a portfolio) then the proceeds must be reinvested somewhere. Portfolio
requirements would suggest that, all else equal, it would be desirable to
replace the security by one with similar characteristics. Although "wash
sales" are precluded by tax laws, investment brokers publish lists of
similar stocks to aid tax exchanges (Sharpe (1981, p. 205)) that would
weaken any price pressure effect. Sharpe concludes (1981, p. 205):
End-of-year sales and purchases motivated by tax considerations are
fairly common. Volume in securities that experienced substantial price
-5-
changes during the year tends to be high as holders sell to realize gains
or losses. However, no major fall in prices appears to result from this
pressure. Buyers apparently recognize that the sellers are motivated by
knowledge of the tax laws, and not some previously unrecognized news of
disastrous developments affecting the companies in question. (Emphasis
added.
}
If the price pressure argument were true, we should observe a general
decline in prices of small firm stocks in December even if no unusually
detrimental information about them was filtering into the market. Keim
(1982b) finds evidence of general price increases for these shares in
December.
Finally, there appear to be relatively simple ways to avoid or exploit
any "low" price, if it did in fact exist. Those who sold a little before
3
the rush would avoid the large price pressure loss. Anyone not forced to
sell an underpriced security for tax purposes would stand to gain large
excess returns by purchase of those securities.
Even the case for abnormal tax-loss selling of small firm stocks at
year-end is not clearcut. It is easy to see why it would be preferable to
time tax-loss sales at year-end as opposed to (say) a few days later (in the
following year) to avoid waiting another twelve months for the benefit of
the tax loss. However, why not recognize capital losses as they occur
throughout the year? Given the existing tax structure and wash sale rules,
Constantinides (1982, p. 35) argues that "investors have an incentive to
realize capital losses immediately". This would result in only a fraction
of total tax-loss selling being affected by realizations in December rather
than in January. Reinganum (1982, p. 9) argues that if investors do not
follow a year-end policy, they "might accumulate short-term losses in excess
of the (legal) amount which can be deducted from income," but this argument
does not explain why the investor would not move his or her tax loss sales
back slightly to avoid the rush. Although Reinganum (1982) finds a negative
-6-
relation between January returnk and their percent change in the immediately
preceding months, Keim (1982b) finds '^±'3 -rela'feton; iji-a^ f.ea:|!^€hdar monti;L3,^,..~^ "^
not just January.
"-'-^ ^ --- so xnBqiso-,-, 9/.
ab s^^^
There may also be tax related selling of large as well as small firm
stocks. If marginal transactions costs are low or zero, it is not obvious
why losses on the stocks of larger firms would not also be realized. In
fact, costs associated with realizing a given dollar loss may be higher for
SiSSCf
)
small firm securities. This is particularly important since the limit of
$3,000 on deductions for capital losses may be binding, especially for
' ~ ' ." aa .'• 'i
larger portfolios. Although losses can be carried forward, an investor may
not want to sell only big losers (small stocks) since that would ignore '
'
'
possible diversification losses, and reduce the present value of the losses*
In addition, it is not clear that small firms will necessarily provide the
big losses, since even though they tend to have high return variance, they
also typica,lly^ have high expected returns.
Finally, Constantinides (1982) shows that, under certain conditions,
some taxable investors will also find it optimal to realize capital gains on
small firm stocks as well as, or instead of, capital losses, indicating that
"
the emphasis on tax loss selling is misplaced. In short, the U.S. tax
position is somewhat ambiguous, and certainly does not necessarily imply-~^e-~—
'j'-''.'ea 8no0
end of year price pressure on small firm stock prices relied on m the tax-
loss hypothesis. Further, such pressure on prices in December does not show
up in the U.S. data. - .
zi cfEiU sscjpzn (e .q ,<:s'^ ' uneL nl nerij
3. Australian Taxes
The Australian tax year is from July 1 to June 30 for all but a few
Australian taxpayers. Capital gains/losses are either treated as ordinary
-'on asob
income/^e.c^uptions and taxed at the ordinary rate (in general, if the
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taxpayer is classified as a "share trader"), or are not subject to taxes at
all (in general, if the taxpayer is an "investor").
All taxpaying financial institutions [e.g., insurance companies, banks,
and non-exempt superannuation (pension) funds] are automatically classed as
share traders. Share traders pay taxes at normal rates on all realized
gains and deduct all realized losses, regardless of the length of holding
period. Other taxpayers may choose to nominate all or part of a portfolio
as being held for trading purposes, although this does not bind the Taxation
Commissioner.
The Commissioner is more li)cely to be persuaded that shares are held
for investment purposes if they pay dividends and are not turned over
frequently. Investors are not taxed on gains, nor can they deduct losses,
on shares held for a year or more. Gains on shares held for less than a
4
year are taxed, and a recent court decision denies a deduction for losses
on shares held less than a year. Isolated "speculative" transactions by
investors, for example purchases of shares in non-dividend paying oil
exploration companies, attract tax on any gains. Losses normally will be
deductible if the investor promptly notifies the taxation authorities of the
purchase.
Since the rationale for a tax effect comes from the ability of capital
losses to directly offset ordinary income, "traders" in Australia appear to
have similar incentives for June tax-loss selling as exist in the U.S. in
December. In fact, the incentive may be stronger since they are not limited
to the $3,000 deduction.
Certainly there appears to be no reason to predict a January seasonal
based on Australian tax law. An alternative possibility is that if shares
are accessible to both Australian and U.S. investors, then a January
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seasonal in the U.S. may show up in Australia to prevent arbitrage.
However, this would create another arbitrage possibility for those not
subject to U.S. taxes, which extends the class of those a±ile to profit from
any tax-selling induced price changes. Further, the securities of main
interest, those of small firms, are unlikely to be of primary interest to
foreign investors. The same arguments would apply to Australian listed
stocks held by U.S. investors.
4. Data
4. 1 General
The data base used is a merged version of three monthly data files. In
all cases, only the most senior, ordinary share is included in the merged
data base of 1924 shares. The first file. Brown's "N=909" file, covers the
period January 1958 to December 1973, and comprises all "industrial" shares
listed on an Australian stock exchange, with par value not less than $1
million (Aust. ). The second "AGSM/CRA" file covers January 1958 through
February 1979, and comprises all listed mining and oil shares where the
company's main operations are in Australia. The third file, an early
version of the AGSM Share Data File, begins January 1974, is current, and
comprises all listed Australian shares.
The merged file is used to construct a value weighted market index,
with the weights based on market values of equity in the second previous
month. A file of riskless rates of return is constructed from Australian
Treasury Bills. Ten size ranked portfolios have been constructed, with
updating each month t based on market value of equity deciles in month t -
2. Consequently, the first rate of return available for these portfolios
is in March 1958. The rates of return used in this paper are based on
-9-
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discrete compounding, and returns are equally weighted within each of the
ten size ranked portfolios.
Not all shares were listed for the full period and fewer were traded in
every month. The number of shares for which returns. are available ranges
from a minimum of 281 (February 1958) to a maximum of 937 (April 1974). Two
events that increased ^he number of available securities are capitalization
changes that accompanied decimalization of currency in February 1964, and
the introduction of Australian Associated Stock Exchange uniform listing in
February 1972.
Until January 1974 the smallest shares on the merged file are dominated
by mining and oil shares, because of the $A1 million minimum par value
imposed on the first industrial file. However, since then the inclusion of
all industrial shares adds another set of small stocks. Time series plots
of rates of return for the decile of smallest firms reveal that although
there are outliers around 1974, the small firm portfolio does not show a
readily apparent general increase in variance after 1974, which may indicate
that small industrials are not significantly smaller than small mining and
oil stocks.
In any event, there is an increase in the number of relatively small
stocks in 1974. Further, the data error rate is likely to be higher in the
early version of the AGSM Share Data File because it had not been validated
to the same extent as the other two files. To assess the sensitivity of
our results to the structural change in our data base, analysis was
conducted on subperiods before and after January 1974, and results are
reported where pertinent. Also, robust regression techniques have been used
8
to gauge the sensitivity of our results to extreme returns.
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4.2 Average Returns' and Autocorrelation
The average rate of return, OLS beta and autocorrelation functions for
the value-weigh ted market index and all ten portfolios are given in Table 1
for the overall period March 1958 to June 1981. This table is meant to
summarize the Australian data, and allows comparison with the U.S. size
effect studies (e.g., Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981)) and also with the
earlier work of Officer (1975) who examined seasonalities in Australian
industrial stocks from 1958 to 1970. ,
9
The cross-sectional pattern of higher average returns for small firms
in Table 1 mirrors that reported by Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981) for the
10
U.S. The size effect, whatever its origin, shows up in the Australian data.
A significant feature relative to the statistics for U.S. monthly returns,
is the high first-order serial correlation ranging from 0.16 for the largest
firms to 0.33 for portfolio 8. These estimates are consistent with Officer
(1975, p. 38) who attributes this to more severe non-trading in the
Australian market than in the U.S. In contrast to the U.S. data, the
autocorrelation is less pronounced at both ends of the size spectrum than
11
for the medium size firms. The value weighted market index, which puts
primary emphasis on the largest firms, shows similar autocorrelations to
portfolio 10.
Officer (1975) finds persistence over different subperiods of
significant positive autocorrelation at lags 6 and 9, and significant
negative autocorrelation at lags 13 and 14. The latter were regarded as
particularly surprising, but he reports that they did not appear to have any
predictive ability. Over the subperiod from January 1974 to June 1981,
which is outside Officer's sample period, we find only weak evidence of
negative autocorrelation at these lags. Similarly, autocorrelation
-11-
estimates at lags 6 and 9 vary widely in sign and magnitude across
subperiods in our sample.
In short, there appears reliable evidence (and explanation) for
positive first-order serial correlation and this shows up in subsequent
tests. Although some odd apparent correlation shows up at other lags, it is
much less reliable and may be due to sampling variation. Table 1 also
contains the sample market model beta estimates for the ten portfolios. The
beta estimates are downward-biased due to the non-trading just described,
and we report results using Dimson (1979) betas later.
5. Results
5.1 Raw Data
Praetz (1973), using spectral analysis, reports apparent seasonalities
in the Sydney All Ordinaries Index with peaks in January-February and July-
August and troughs in March-April and November-December. Using time series
analysis, Officer (1975, p. 46) concludes that "the results do not give a
clear indication of any particular type of seasonality," although there is
some evidence of correlation between the returns of March and September.
However, his results (1975, Table 5, p. 44) may show some effects of a
January seasonal, since for his sample index the largest lag 12 serial
correlation occurs for the month of January.
To test for seasonality in Australian mean monthly stock returns, we
estimate the following dummy variable OLS regression:
12
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where
R = return on portfolio p in month t ,
D . . = seasonal dummy for calendar month i ,
i = February, ... /December .
The intercept a , indicates average returns for January, and the dummy
coefficients a . indicate the average differences in return between January
and each respective month. In Table 2, we present estimates of equation (1)
for the overall period March 1958 to June 1981. The results of Table 2 have
been graphed in Figure 1 for visual assessment. Figure 3 contains an
analogous plot of the returns for the five market value portfolios of NYSE
stocks used in Keim (1982b) for comparison with U.S. results.
Table 2 and Figure 1 contain several important results. First, the
smallest-firm portfolio 1 shows higher average returns across all months
than do the other portfolios. The results in Table 1 indicate an average
monthly return of 6.75% for portfolio 1 and 2.23% for portfolio 2. Table 2
and Figure 1 show that this average monthly premium of about 4% seems fairly
constant across all months. Although the statistical significance of these
results is somewhat difficult to judge, given the high first-order
autocorrelation in the residuals shown in Table 2 and the cross-sectional
dependence in the returns, it seems that the size related premium for the
smallest firms exists in all months. Note also the extra information
obtained by the analysis of the size-ranked portfolios vis-a-vis the market
index, which looks most like the large-firm portfolio 10.
Second, for all portfolios, the dummy coefficients in Table 2 are
negative for almost all non-January months, indicating that January does
earn apparently higher returns than most other months. The main exceptions
are the July coefficients for the four smallest portfolios.
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Third» there appears to be more than just a January premium. For
portfolio 1, the smallest firms, there is considerable sampling variation
across months, so that although (say) January and July appear to earn higher
returns than (say) June, the F-statistic reported in Table 2 indicates that
the null hypothesis of no difference across months cannot be rejected for
portfolio 1 at conventional significance levels. However, the null
hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level for portfolios 2 through 6 and
portfolio 8, and barely accepted at this level for portfolios 7, 9 and 10.
For most portfolios, two strong seasonals emerge. December-January and
July-August appear to earn consistently higher returns than do other months,
with the largest returns in January and July. For example, for portfolio 2,
the average December-January and July-August returns are 4.91% and 5.01%
respectively, while the average for other months is 0.87%. (Interestingly,
Figure 3 shows that the largest average returns in the U.S. data also occur
in January and July. ) The January and the July-August seasonals reported by
Praetz (1973) for a market index are confirmed across size ranked
portfolios, but we find little evidence of his reported December trough and
February peak.
Examination of the returns before and after December 1 973 yields
subperiod results whose interpretation is qualitatively equivalent to that
12
for the overall period. The primary difference is that the sample from
January 1974 to June 1981 contains more small firms, and average returns for
the smaller-firm portfolios during this period are much larger than returns
from March 1958 to December 1973. For example, portfolio 1 returns are, on
average, 9.84% per month in contrast to an average of 5.29% during the
earlier subperiod. For the largest-firm portfolio 10, the average first and
second subperiod returns differ by only 0.94%.
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In summary, analysis of the raw returns indicates a strong "size
effect, " and the average small-firm premium appears to be roughly equal
across all months. Second, there are pronounced December-January and July-
August seasonals in average portfolio returns. The tax-loss selling
hypothesis predicts a July seasonal based on Australian tax law, and hence
we conclude that the Australian evidence is inconsistent with at least the
usual form of the tax-loss hypothesis. Even if one invoked an integrated
capital markets hypothesis to explain the January seasonal as a reflection
of U.S. tax-loss selling, neither story explains the Decesiber and August
results.
5.2 Excess Returns Relative to the CAPM
In the previous section, we examined the seasonality of raw returns on
Australian stocks. In this section, we discuss the seasonality of abnormal
returns relative to the one-period Sharpe-Lintner CAPM. In place of (1),
the model is:
V " ^Ft = ^^1 ^ ^^V - ^t^ ^ ^ SiV * %t ' P= ^ 1° (2)
where the additional variables are R„^f the riskless rate of return, and
Rjjj^, the rate of return on the value-weighted index. The coefficients a ' pi,
a' 2 '•••Spl2 "°^ detect any seasonality of average abnormal returns
(relative to the Sharpe-Lintner model). If the abnormal returns display a
seasonal pattern and markets are efficient, there is some systematic
seasonal risk not completely accounted for by the CAPM, or perhaps the beta
measure of risk itself is not seasonally invariant.
In Table 3 and Figure 2 we present estimates of (2) for the overall
period March 1958 to June 1981. There seems to be little serial correlation
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left in the residuals, consistent with the removal of the autocorrelated
market returns reported in Table 1. Statistically, the lack of residual
autocorrelation means that the test statistics are more reliable in Table 3
than in Table 2.
Table 3 and Figure 2 show that a "size effect" similar to that in the
raw returns is also found in excess returns relative to the Sharpe-Lintner
model. For portfolios 1 and 2, average monthly excess returns (across all
months) are 5.66% and 1.27% respectively. Again, the premium of about 4%
per month for the smallest firms seems fairly even across months (see
Figure 2).
Although average excess returns in January and July are larger than
most other months in Table 3, the effect is not as pronounced as for the raw
returns in Table 2. For example, the F-statistics in Table 3 indicate that
we cannot reject at conventional significance levels the hypothesis of equal
excess returns across months for portfolios 9 and 10. As for the raw
returns, despite relatively large absolute differences in the point
estimates of average excess returns across months for portfolio 1, the
sampling variation is sufficiently high that the null hypothesis of
equal excess returns for all months is accepted for the smallest firms. For
portfolios 2-8, the F-statistics indicate rejection of the null hypothesis,
with the largest average excess returns in January and July. The major
implication of Table 3 and Figure 2 is that although the levels of average
excess returns are generally highest around the months of January and July,
the size related premium for small firms is fairly constant across months
(this is readily apparent in Figure 3). This finding is in contrast to the
strong January seasonal in the size related premium in the U.S. data.
-16-
The siibperiods show basically similar results to the overall period^ nz iisl
although again the size effect is more pronounced in the second period -Jr :}?i}{tE!t!
January 1974 to June 1981 in which there are more small firms. - "O-i-f sIs'Trono^^ca
We have also fitted a variation of (2) which examines the January and ..£.;.
July abnormal returns separately:""""^ "
'^ ^ '"''^ """"^^ ^ '^^^"'^ t>nfi Z old^T
v.>:^rMa. ^n.x-a. _.,3o^e ni tnuo^ oals ax an:.n:?„..
. ? -1,...,10, t 1,.>...5..^«., .v,,f tn. ,a,., s.. (eri,.o.
where D and D are defined as seasonal dummies for January and Julyiiom laq
In addition to model (3), which we estimated with OLS, we estimated the ' aii.'pj:'?
following time series model employing Dimson's tiyi9f%stLmSii^6tf<ir''iiet.k>iL'.
R - R » a* + r B' (R - - R„ ) + v' ,D + Y' -,D + U (4)
'
p'-"l...,,10;'' t'-'l^;;;,T-''^^^"*^^"»3 ^-fi J09t92 ^cnnsD ?,w
-^:V or-:; ::..!; : . ^o^ ^U. «oiio?- .-
The results are given in Table 4. As in Table 3, the removal of market .-9
effects by model (3) accentuates the July seasonal relative to January, and : 3^
this is more pronounced using Dimson's estimator in in?)del (4). However>-;ij:.;83
even the use of the Dimson estimator and January and July dummies does notiriiiio;.
remove the "size effect"—the average abnormal monthly returns across other ..s
months for portfolio 1 still exceed abnormal returns for portfolio 2 by over q
4%.
^•"—-^^ it^s:jA:^ SPE-'yr. ^ssp-iii S/U ^U s.W
6. Summary and Conclusions ^^ "^ ''^^-'•^' ^^"^ ^- ^-^^'^' ^o noicfsoilqmi
?'.;' ri.7i;0~f, -1-;>Q,V. ;r/ .,.ir,.., .
Evidence from U.S. stock returns suggests that a large proportion ofasoxa
the "size effect" consists of a premium for small firms in Januaryv^'i I'Ssa enj
Australian returns show an average premium of at least 4% per month for the
smallest-firm decile (portfolio 1) relative to any other decile, and this-: ;..<:;
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premium appears to be fairly constant across months in contrast to U.S.
data.
While recent research has attributed the U.S. January premium in large
part to tax-loss selling, we have argued that there are persuasive a priori
reasons for questioning the importance of tax-loss selling as an
explanation. In Australia where the tax year-end is June 30, we should
expect a perhaps even stronger "July effect" under that hypothesis because,
for market participants classified as "traders", there is no $3,000 limit
for the loss deduction. What we find is more complex than the simple tax-
loss selling hypothesis predicts. Pronounced seasonals (in raw returns)
occur in December-January and July-August, with the largest (and roughly
equal) effects in January and July.
It is conceivable that a tax-induced January effect in the U.S. could
show up in Australian data due to arbitrage across capital markets. But this
response is, at best, incomplete. The tax-loss selling hypothesis itself
relies on an absence of arbitrage from those not forced to sell a particular
security for tax purposes. It seems difficult to reconcile an integrated
capital market, that functions so well that a U.S. tax-induced January
seasonal shows up in even penny stocks in Australia, with simultaneous
mispricing of securities to create the original U.S. January seasonal.
Moreover, if the January and July premiums are induced by U.S. and
Australian tax law, what is the cause of the December and August premiums?
For August, one might argue that non-trading causes the July effect to show
up in August returns, or that the tax-effect is somewhat continuous and
shoulij appear in months subsequent to July. But if so, why is there no
apparent February seasonal in both Australia and the U.S., and what explains
the December results?
-18-
On balance, we regard the Australian evidence as difficult to reconcile
with the tax-loss selling hypothesis. Although the original hypothesis is
at least consistent with the U.S. January premium, the story seems to be
much more complicated if it is to be reconciled with the Australian data.
It seems more promising to investigate possible equilibrium causes of the
U.S. January seasonal, perhaps by comparing the relative timing of events
other than tax years in Australia and the U.S.
This conclusion is further supported by Keim's {1982b) finding that the
January effect is a significant phenomenon in every year (except two) from
1931 to 1979, even during periods (e.g., prior to World War II) when
personal tax rates were relatively low and when the benefit of the capital
loas offset was lower. The magnitude of the January effect does not seem
sensitive to variations in the tax rate. In one sentence, tax loss selling
still leaves us at a loss for an explanation of the January effect.
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FOOTNOTES
Thus, the rationale for a year-end tax effect arises from the ability
of capital losses to directly offset ordinary income. In the U.S., realized
capital gains and losses are short-term if the asset has been held for one
year or less, and long-term otherwise. Short-term gains or losses are taxed
as ordinary unearned income, while long-term gains and losses are taxed at
forty percent of the investor's marginal tax rate on ordinary income since
sixty percent of long-term gains or losses are excluded from taxable income.
Net short-term losses and net long-term gains incurred in the same year,
however, offset each other. Also, net short-term losses and fifty percent
of net long-term losses are limited to a deduction level of $3,000 in any
year. Unused capital losses may be carried forward indefinitely.
2
The same line of reasoning implies the potential for a late April
effect as investors experience liquidity drains during the income tax filing
period, although no such seasonal has been found. Constantinides (1982,
p. 38) discusses a variant of this hypothesis, under which selling pressure
throughout the year is "suddenly relieved at the beginning of January". Our
arguments apply to this variant also.
This is especially the case since they are free to redefine their
personal tax year to differ from the usual December 31 year-end.
4
F.C.T. v. Werchon and Anor. (1982) 82 A.T.C. 4332.
Details of file construction and composition for all files are
available from The Australian Graduate School of Management, University of
Kew South Wales, P.O. Box 1, Kensington, N.S.W. 2033 AUSTRALIA.
We repeated all tests based on continuously compounded returns. For
raw returns, the results are essentially unchanged from those reported. For
abnormal returns we used an equally weighted market index, which removed
more of the seasonal effect from small-firm portfolios than did the value
weighted index used in reported results.
7
Extreme outliers (price relatives less than 0.2 or greater than 5.0)
were verified. There were 87, of which 42 proved to be correct. The rest
were deleted.
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g
The robust methods used follow Huber (1964) (1977) and Krasker-Welsch
(1979). Outliers are defined relative to both regression and explanatory
variable space. All computations have been made using the BIF and BIFMOD
programs in the TROLL package (see Peters, Samarov and Welsch (1982)). The
results were not significantly changed.
9
Note that "the pattern" does not consist of ten independent
observations (since the returns are cross-sectionally dependent), and it
must be interpreted with this in mind.
Preliminary tests (Brown, Kleidon and Marsh (1982b)) indicate that the
stochastic nature of the U.S. size effect (after allowing for a
deterministic January seasonal) reported by Brown, Kleidon and Marsh (1982a)
does not seem to describe the Australian size ranked portfolios. Any change
in the size premium seems more akin to a steady, deterministic drift,
although the stochastic component may be obscured by high volatility of
Australian returns.
Aside from sampling variation, a possible explanation for this pattern
lies in the popularity and, therefore, heavier trading volume of small firm
"penny stocks" relative to (say) the stocks of small NYSE-AMEX firms.
12
However, the second subperiod has only 8 observations per month, and
shows greater sample variation than does the earlier period.
Although the seasonals for January, July and August show up in excess
returns as in raw returns, the excess returns are influenced by the seasonal
pattern for the market index, and one effect is that in general the December
seasonal disappears. The raw returns in Table 2 show that the market index
has higher average returns in December than in any other month (December has
the only positive dummy coefficient, 0.31%). Even for the (equally
weighted) largest-firm portfolio 10, the December dummy coefficient is
negative. Portfolio returns are equally weighted, so large December returns
for the largest firms in portfolio 10 can result in a negative dummy
coefficient for portfolio 10 and a positive coefficient for the value-
weighted market index. (For an equally weighted index (of continuously
compounded returns), the December dummy coefficient is negative.) The
removal of the large December returns for the market index leaves no
residual December seasonal in excess returns. Similar effects can be seen
in, say, January and July. The index shows a negative July dummy
coefficient in Table 2, and so a positive coefficient for July relative to
January in the small-firm portfolios is accentuated m the excess returns in
Table 3.
14
For all portfolios other than portfolio 10, the coefficient on the
lagged market index appears significant. Preliminary work showed that lags
greater than 1, and leads, were not significantly different from zero.
-21-
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Table 1
Average monthly rates of return, ordinary least squares beta estimates ,£' and correlograms
of monthly rates of return for ten portfolios constructed by equally weighting monthly rates
of return on all Australian industrial, mining and oil stockak' in each decile of size
(measured by market value of equity),—' and for the value-weightedS.' market index of all
Australian industrial , mining and oil stocks, over the period March 1958 to June 1981.
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Table 4
Estimates of the average excess monthly rate of return for the months of
January and July, and the average excess monthly rate of return for all
other calendar months combined, relative to the Sharpe-Lintner capital
asset pricing model, on ten portfolios constructed by equally weighting
monthly rates of return on all Australian industrial, mining and oil
stocks— in each decile of size (measured by market value of equity)—
over the period March 1958 to June 1981.
Part A - Estimation with OLS Betas
pt Ft p p Mt Ft 'p,l t 'p,2 t pt
p =• 1,...,10; t = 1,...,T
Table 4 (cont'd)
Part B - Estimation With Dimson Betas
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Fig. 3. Plot of the average monthly rates of return (in percent) for five market
value portfolios constr^icted by Keim (1982b) from firms on the NYSE for each monthover the period January, 1931 to December, 1978,
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